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Abstract
Building upon the tenets of Signaling Theory, Spence (1974), this paper introduces the
concept of human resource management reputation signals and examines the effects of these
signals on the financial perfOlmance of over 500 organizations. Numerous human resource, and
overall corporate, reputation signals which have appeared in the popular business press are
examined to ascenain their effects on two performance measures, the abnormal shareholder
returns which occur either side of the announcement of these signals and the annual returns to
shareholders in the year in which they are made public.
In the end, it appears that is more imponant to utilize ones human resources effectively
than it is to be included on the "best" or "most admired" lists of the various business observers
who create and disseminate these reputation signals. Indeed, the vast majority of the corporate
and human resource reputation signals studied had no effect on either shon or long term
performance. However, a human resource management effectiveness indicator (net income per
employee) was observed to be positively related to the annual shareholder return performance
measure suggesting that it is better to be good than to just look good.
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Digital Equipment Corporation announces its first ever layoffs; about 3,500 expected by
mid-year (Wall Street Journal, January 10,1991). Merck is named as the most admired
corporation in America for the fourth straight year (Fortune , February 11, 1991). Herman
Miller is cited in two best selling employment guides.
Signals such as these abound in the marketplace, but the question is, do they matter, and
to whom? Do they influence the attitudes and behaviors of a company's stockholders, applicants,
employees, customers, potential owners, owners, or security analysts? On the other hand, do
observers discount this information, or dismiss it altogether, because it is common knowledge or
originates from unknown or unreliable sources?
This study examines whether any relationship exists between an organization's human
resource reputation and its financial performance by examining the effects of an array of
corporate and human resource reputation signals on corporate performance. To explore the
effects that reputation has on performance, this research invokes a signaling perspective (Spence,
1974). Consider the case of an organization "officially designated" as a "great" place to work. As
a result, would potential owners, owners, and security analysts reason that the fIrm would be able
to attract a broader and deeper applicant pool from which to select employees? Would they
surmise that this increased selectivity will translate into an improved work force and, in turn,
better financial performance at the individual, group, business unit, or firm level? Most
importantly, would the prospect of improved performance induce potential owners to pay more
for a share of stock, while current owners simultaneously increase their selling prices, resulting in
increased demand, decreased supply, and, thus, a higher equilibrium price?
We examined this relationship with three goals in mind: (1) to review a set of related
theoretical perspectives that pertain to reputation and evaluate their usefulness for understanding
the concept of reputation in general, and extend them to include human resource reputation, (2)
to scrutinize the conjecture found in the business press--which asserts that reputation and fInancial
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perfonnance are inexnicably linked, and (3) to extend the reputation-perfonnance model by
examining the relationship between human resource reputation and corporate performance.
Theoretical perspectives on organizational reputation emanate from a host of social
science and managerial disciplines. For example, accountants use the concept of goodwill to
explain and value reputation (Munn, 1983), marketers manage reputations through institutional
advertising (Borden, 1942), and economists examine the role of reputation as a controlling and
optimizing mechanism (CanTIichael,1984; Fama, 1980; Spence, 1974).
The business press, too, cites the need for companies to create and maintain good
reputations (Fortune, 1983-1991). Indeed, business pundits assert that a favorable reputation will
attract employees, customers, lenders, and stockholders, while an unfavorable reputation will send
these parties fleeing to the competition.
Several empirical studies of reputation have been reported recently. Most have focused
primarily on the determinants of corporate reputation (Fombron & Shanley, 1990; McGuire,
Schneeweis, & Branch, 1990). These researchers have struggled with both the definition and
measurement of reputation. To date, all of the published studies rely on one, single-item measure
of reputation--created, measured, and collected by Fortune (1983-1991). The effect that
reputation has on corporate perfonnance, however measured, remains a riddle.
This study is markedly different from the earlier research. First, it calls upon a number of
theoretical perspectives in the social sciences. Then, it coalesces around one suggesting that
reputation announcements are signals (Spence, 1974), signals that help alleviate bounded
rationality problems by reducing decision maker's information searches and lessening their
cognitive loads (Simon, 1957). Second, it moves beyond relying on Fortune's single-item measure
of corporate reputation to include other pertinent reputation signals including designations such
as: "a best company for working mothers," "a best company for women," and "a best company
for blacks." Third, this study employs an event study methodology to estimate the reputation-
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perfonnance relationship more precisely. This methodology<> captures the immediate impact of
reputation signals on stock market performance.
Fourth, we analyze the most recent reputation data available. Through an agreement!
with the publishers of Fortune, reputation data for 1983-1989 were obtained and incorporated
into this analysis.
Equation 1 expresses the generic model that under girds this study. It represents the
relationship between human resource reputation and corporate perfonnance while controlling for
the effects of: overall corporate reputation, human resource performance, and corporate
accounting perfonnance.
(1) CPto-Hn =f(HRRto, CRto, HRPt-l' CPt-I)
where:
CPto-Hn =Corporate Financial Perfonnance succeeding a FIRreputation signal
announcement (to-4n)
HRRto =Human Resource Management Reputation Signa1(s) at to
CRto = Corporate Reputation Signal(s) at to
HRPt-l =Human Resource Management Perfonnance at t-l
CPt-l =Corporate Accounting Performance at t-l
In the sections that follow, we review the three relevant literatures that address the
reputation signaling phenomenon (theoretical, practical, and empirical). They all hold that (1)
reputation is influential, (2) favorable reputations generate positive outcomes, and (3) unfavorable
reputations invoke negative ones. Then we explicate our model and the study's three hypotheses.
OSee: Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; Faroa, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll, 1969; Bowman, 1983; Ball and Brown,
1968.
IFortune writes, "We cannot grant permission for you to reprint the material in its entirety, either by individual
year or historically, as 1983-1989."
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The research design is outlined next and the results follow. In the final section we present our
conclusions, revisit and recast the theoretical perspectives employed, and raise future research
issues.
THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION
Corporate reputation has been defined as the collective judgment of the organization's
overall character by groups of similarly interested and informed people that are based primarily on
the past actions of the firm (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Some
scholars suggest that the varied, multiple constituencies of individual managers (e.g., superiors,
peers, and subordinates) and operating units like the human resource management department
(e.g., line managers, union officials, and government agencies) render reputation assessments too
(fsui, 1984; 1987; 1990). Moreover, there is some evidence thatreputational effectiveness, when
it is not interpreted a measure of performance itself, is positively related to other, more
conventional, measures of performance (fsui, 1984; 1987). All to say, reputation, be it that of an
individual, a business function, or an organization, has been a topic of interest of late and
throughout history.
The origins of the notion of reputation are murky, but it is often referred to. Cicero
claimed, "To disregard what the world thinks of us is not only arrogant but utterly shameless,"2
Napoleon noted that, "a great reputation is a great noise: the more there is made, the farther off it
is heard,"3 and Proverbs proclaims (22:1), "a good name is more desirable than riches."
Individuals, groups, and societies, understandably, define reputation for their own purposes.
Websters (1979) defines reputation as follows:
2Stevenson (1988, p. 1700)
3Ibid.
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Re.putation n 1 a: overall quality or character as seen or judged by people in general b:
recognition by other people of some characteristic or ability <has the -of being clever> 2: a
place in public esteem or regard: good name.
The business press, often expresses corporate reputation in what appears to be
multidimensional terms. For example, Fortune's (1983-1991) annual, intra-industry survey
obtains reputation assessments on eight dimensions from some 8,0004executives, directors, and
security analysts. These eight dimensions are: Quality of Management; Quality of Products or
Services; Innovativeness; Social Responsibility; Long-term Investment Value; Financial
Soundness; Use of Corporate Assets; and Ability to Attract, Keep, and Develop Talent.
This survey provides the data for an annual "Most Admired Companies in America" feature
story.s Indeed, Fortune's reputation rankings, for the 10 largest firms in 30 industries, appear to
be salient. indeed important, to the business community, especially those ranked among the best
Not surprisingly, these highly ranked companies bring this favorable information to the
attention of their owners, investors, employees, and job applicants. Merck, for example, touts its
stellar image whenever and wherever possible. In one annual report (Merck, 1987), the company
revealed that it: was named as America's most admired corporation for the second year in a row
(Fortune, January 18, 1988), had been designated the most innovative company in the
pharmaceutical industry (Forbes, January 11, 1988), was recognized as one of the five best
managed companies (Business Month, December 1987), had one of its products selected as a
product of the year (Fortune, December 7, 1987), had its sales force named the best in the
pharmaceutical industry (Sales and Marketin~ Manae-ement,June 1987), had been cited as one of
the best U.S. companies for working mothers (Workine-Mother, August 1987), and was
described as one of the best companies in public service $usiness Week, January II, 1988).
4-rhe response rate for this survey averages about 50%, some 4,000 responses. If these are equal across industries,
there are approximately 133 replies for each industry group (e.g, retailing, furniture, etc.)
5Published in mid-January annually since 1983.
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Merck communicates this information through other media as well. Job applicants across
the country receive copies of Fortune's "most admired" article and an excerpt from the 100 Best
Companies to Work For book. There is even a billboard outside Merck's corporate headquarters
in recognition of the company being named the most admired corporation for five years running
(1986-1991).
Academic researchers have also examined the notion of corporate reputation. To date,
they have focused more on the detenninenents side of the equation and have concluded that
reputation is, in part, a function of fmancial performance. In summary, a wide array of business
participants, observers, and researchers have addressed the corporate reputation issue and they
all share two basic conclusions: reputation should be important and often it is.
Why DR Reputation Might Be Important
Importance to prospective employees. Stigler (1962), in his work on the acquisition of
information in the labor market, claims that job applicants face a "problem of how to acquire
information on the wage rates, stability of employment, conditions of employment, and other
determinants of job choice, and how to keep this information current" (p. 94). Newspaper
advertisements and "the myriad forms of pooling of information" (p. 102) are among these
sources.
Undoubtedly, this demand for labor market information is manifest in the recent
publication of a host of employment guides including: The Best 100 Com,panies to Work For
(Levering, Moskowitz, and Katz, 1984), The Best Companies for Women (Zietz and Dusky,
1988), "The Best Companies for Blacks" (Black Entewrise, February 1982; 1986), and "The
N.S.B.E. 100" (National Society of Black En~eers, November 1990).
The sales of these guides and the reputation afforded to the organizations who make these
"lists" provides some evidence that HR policies influence corporate reputation judgments. These
(
works evaluate companies on different sets of criteria such as equal employment, compensation,
benefits, employee relations, recruitment, selection, ~d promotional opportunities.
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Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that suggests that corporate image affects
employee attitudes and behaviors (Acito and Ford, 1980). A related study reported that people
were more likely to pursue employment with "high" image companies than with "low" image ones
(Belt and Paolillo, 1982).
Importance to employers. Some posit that cultivating a good reputation in the mind's
eye of employees and prospects helps fIrms attract broader and deeper applicant pools (Rynes
and Barber, 1990). For example, I.B.M. recently commissioned a study to examine its reputation
in contrast to those of its competitors (Towers, Perrin, Foster, & Crosby, 1989).
Importance to others. To be sure, employees, job applicants, and competitors are not
the only parties rendering and reacting to reputation judgments. Customers and potential
customers are also among those who factor information pertaining to rums' human resource
policies and practices into their reputation judgments. Indeed, some suggest that these judgments
may, or should, influence the decision to buy (Lydenberg, Marlin, and Strub, 1986).
THE CONCEPI' OF REPUTATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The Effects of Reputation
Theorists from a variety of academic disciplines all posit that reputation impacts the affairs
of individuals and organizations. In general, they concur on another premise as well: favorable
reputations evoke positive outcomes and unfavorable ones have the opposite effect.
For example, the notion of goodwill (see Munn, 1983) holds that as the reputation of the
firm improves, so too will the premium that investors are willing to pay for an ownership stake.
Conversely, a tarnished reputation will erode or eliminate this premium. In the worst scenario,
short of going out of business, the equities markets affIXa lower value to the firm than the
accurately and reliably computed value of its physical assets.
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In the employee selection process, signaling theory (Spence, 1974) suggests that in the
..
absence of observable factors, candidates who posses and resonate superior reputations stand to
improve their employment chances. Alternatively, if reputation is a phenomenon that is
observable and measurable, screening theory also suggests that a favorable reputation will
increase the likelihood of being hired (see Stiglitz, 1975). Furthermore, Fama (1980) asserts that
the labor market has a built-in mechanism to reward those with good reputations and punish those
without.
On the other hand, when prospective employees look at an organization, the fInn's
reputation may serve as a substitute for an explicit contract between the corporation and its
employees (Carmichael, 1984; Rousseau, 1990). Reputations influence consumers too--and
favorable reputations are likely to translate into improved sales (Borden, 1942). He also suggests
that corporate advertising helps remedy public relations problems and improves employee morale.
Corporate partners, when assessing the value to be gained from coordinating their efforts, also
render reputation judgments (Pfeffer, 1976). Individuals, too, make judgments about one and
other, based on reputations. Indeed, some believe that favorable reputations translate into power,
prestige, and influence (Carnegie, 1936; Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1964; Jones and Wortman, 1973;
and Wortman and Linsenmeier, 1977).
Reputation from the Signaling Perspective
It should be clear by now that various theoretical perspectives in the social sciences help
to explain why and how HR reputation might matter in the affairs of an organization. Among
these different perspectives, signaling theory (Spence, 1974) appears to be the most parsimonious
in that it is easily applied at the organization level, holds that reputation plays a role in exchanges
between organizations and individuals, and predicts that favorable reputations will be related to
positive outcomes and unfavorable reputations will be associated with negative ones.
Signaling theory's (Spence, 1974) basic premise is that sometimes complete and accurate
information for the prediction of an individual's future productivity is unobtainable. So, people
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undertake certain actions that are observable and measurable to signal, albeit impeIfectly, their
value. Creating and maintaining a favorable reputation may be one such action.
Specifically, Spence (1974) posited that an investment in education could serve as a signal.
In such a setting, a job applicant sends what he hopes will be a favorable, informative signal (the
acquisition of a college degree, for example) to an employer who, in turn, receives, interprets, and
acts upon this signal. Essentially, the employer formulates a set of beliefs about the relationship
between the applicant's educational accomplishment and his future productivity, and then makes a
wage offer based on education level. Therefore, prospective employees invest in education to
signal their ability and to enhance their competitive position. The degree to which these signals
confirm the employer's presuppositions over time determines the weight the employer will affix to
them in the future.
In this study, the original roles are switched. Here, it is the or~anization that creates and
maintains reputation signals, and it is the stakeholders who receive, interpret, and act upon the
signals. As noted, job applicants and shareholders are but two of the stakeholder groups these
signals influence. Also, note that extending the notion of signaling to an organization is not new.
Others have suggested that organizations create and send signals to various constituencies. For
instance, Meyer (1979) argues that an organization's structure sends a signal to its external
parties. Likewise, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) identify corporate advertising as a viable
mechanism for finns to use to signal to their various constituencies.
It is imperative to mention one fundamental assumption for this study, the efficient
markets hypothesis6 (Fama, 1970). This paradigm, which focuses on the release and
dissemination of new information, suggests that any reputation signal that carries new information
to the capital, labor, or product markets will influence the behaviors of market participants and it
will do so immediately. All to say, positive (negative) changes in reputation that make their way
6Arguments in favor of the efficient markets hypothesis abound. Fama's is the clearest and, probably, the most
widely cited. For a summary of studies which have allegedly weakened this hypothesis see Bromiley, Govekar, and
Marcus (1988).
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to the markets should immediately raise (lower) the value of the fIrm's stock in financial markets,
increase (decrease) its attractiveness as an employer in labor markets, and increase (decrease) its
sales in product markets.
THE CONCEPT OF REPUTATION IN THE BUSINESS PRESS
Reputation, and the assertion that it may have a tangible value, has taken on increased
importance in the business and managerial press in the last decade (Rock, 1984).7Prescriptive
guides, written to help build and maintain corporate reputations, and descriptive assessments,
developed to measure and compare reputations, have appeared in ever increasing numbers.
Table 2 lists some of the corporate and HB.M..reputationsignals that have appeared in the business
press.
Prescriptive Works
Corporate reputation "how to" manuals began to emerge in the 1980's. These works,
which have originated primarily in advertising and public relations (Dowling, 1986; 1988; Gray,
1986; Garbett, 1988), often substitute the term "image" for "reputation." Collectively, they
maintain that organizational reputation is an asset that must be managed. They provide
prescriptions for the creation, tracking, maintenance, and improvement of corporate reputation.
Not surprisingly, each volume proposes a related, yet somewhat unique, set of strategies for
building an exemplary corporate reputation. Specific suggestions for reputation embellishment
include: changing the name of the company (Garbett, 1988), conducting a reputation audit
among employees and customers (Dowling, 1986), and instituting effective external
communications programs (Gray, 1986).
7Rock. the publisher of Mer~ers and Acquisitions, poses and calls for dialogue on a fundamental question, "Can
any portion of corporate value be attributed to a company's public posture--its image, reputation, visibility, or
recognition factor?"
Table:1 Conjecture In tbe press.
Corporate Reputation Signals Source Format Sample Criteria &aiel Year(s)2
All Stakeholders
"Most Admired" ~Paiodical 300 8 0.10 1983-91
"Recognizable & Reputable" Wall Street Joomal Newspaper 800 4 1-5 1984-91
"Excellent" Peters & Watennan Book 43 7 0,1 1982
"Best Managed" Business Month Periodical 5 1 0,1 1972-90
"Quality Management" US Depl Commerce Ceremony 6 7 0,1 1988-91
"Best & Worst" Mother Jones Periodical 20 1 0,1 1985
"Most Important" Peters Newspaper 20 1 0,1 1988
Custom~~
"Wmners" Brouillard Report 45 18 0.5 1988
"Socially Responsible" Lydenberg et a!. Book 200 7 0-4 1986
"Best Service" Zemke & Schaaf Book 101 1 0,1 1989
"Best Sales Forces" Sales & Mktl!. MI!1DL Periodical 100 7 1-10 1984-90
~"Bestto Own" Walden Book 100 5 0,1 1989
"Best for Shareholders" United Shareholders Report 1000 3 1-1000 1989-90
lIn spite of some of these assessments using several criteria, the essential RpUfahon signal is inclnsion on a "best" IisL Thus the 0,1 designation.
2lf more than one year is indicated then the reputation signal is released 8IIDUaIly. 0Ihetwise, the year indicared is the first one in which the
signal appears.
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Table 2 Conjecture in the press (continued.).
HR Reputation Signals Source Format Sluaple Criteria Scalel Year(s)2
~IStakeholders
"Most Admired" ~Periodical 300 1 0-10 1983-91
"Most Innovative HRM" Kravetz Boot ISO many H.M.L 1988
"Best in HRM" Towers et aI. Report 10 18 1.10 1990
Emolovees
"Best to Work For" Levering et aI. Boot 100 5 0,1 1984
"Best for a Career" Business Todav Periodical ISO 20 varies 1985-90
~"Bestfor Women" Zietz & Dusky Boot 52 1 0,1 1988
"Best for Working Mothers" Workinr Mother Periodical 75 4 0,1 1986-90
''Family Friendly" Galinsky et aI. Boot 188 1 1-188 1991
"Best for Women" Catalyst Ceranony 3-4 1 0,1 1991
Other GrouDs
"Best for Blacks" Blaclc Entemrise Periodical 2.5 1 0,1 1982,86
"Best for Engineers" Gradualiru! Enl!ineer Periodical 2.5 1 0,1 1982-90
"Best for Biacle Engineers" ~Periodical 100 1 0.1 1989-90
"Best to Sell For" Bimes & Marlanan Boot 100 4 0,1 1985
1 In spite of some of these assessments using several criteria, the essenlial iepUtation signal is inclusion on a "best" fisL Thus the 0,1 designation.
2 If more than one year is indicated then the reputation signal is released _ually. Otherwise. the year indicated is the first one in which the
signal appears.
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Descriptive Assessments
Clearly, numerous publications provide corporate reputation assessments to an array of
interested audiences including job applicants, customers, and investors. In addition, throughout
the 1980's business observers conducted numerous investigations, employing varied degrees of
rigor, to discover and describe organizations with the best HRM reputations, companies
employing the "best" people and treating them "right" IBM, for instance, appeared on many of
these "best" lists (Black Enteq>rise, 1982, 1986; Fortune, January 10, 1983; Levering et al., 1984;
Zietz and Dusky, 1988), as did little, and little-known, Herman Miller (Fortune, January 6, 1986;
Levering et al., 1984; Zietz and Dusky, 1988). Increasingly, specialized human resource
reputation assessments are being rendered. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that many business
publications consider HR reputation to be important also; in that they provide information on this
topic to numerous constituencies including females, minorities, professionals, and salespeople.
To summarize, it appears that there are various reasons for creating corporate and human
resource management reputation signals (to influence job applicants, employees, and customers)
and various means for communicating these signals (including customized reports, articles in
periodicals, and employment guides). The recent spurt in the number and proliferation of
reputation signals provides some evidence that the unfulIilled needs for corporate and FIR
reputation assessments are increasingly being identified and fulfIlled
THE CONCEPT OF REPUTATION IN THE RESEARCH LITERATURE
Research on corporate reputation has emerged in fInance (McGuire, Schneeweis, and
Branch, 1990; Sobol and Farrelly, 1988), strategic management (Chakravarthy, 1986; Fombrun
and Shanley, 1990; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), and economics (see: Camerer, 1985; Wilson,
1985). Regardless of the discipline, they model reputation as a factor that contributes to
organizational success. The influence of HRM reputation on fIrm performance, however, has
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been practically ignored. This is the case, despite a burgeoning literature that argues that the
successful management of human resources provides an organization with a competitive
advantage. Indeed, some posit that this HR driven advantage translates directly into
organizational success (Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills, & Walton, 1984; Dyer and Holder, 1988;
Kanter, 1983, 1989).
Contemporaneous Relationships
To date, only a few studies have moved beyond simple bivariate correlations to analyze
the relationship between reputation and performance.
Fortune's annual analyses into the relationship between reputation and performance, which
invariably report that companies with better reputations perform better, are the first exception.
For example, in an analysis of 1987 performance (Fortune, January 18,1988), they reported that
the median ten-year average return to shareholders for the ten "most admired" fIrms was 22.5%.
This exceeded, by a factor of 37, the median return for the ten least admired fIrms (.6%).
However, Fortune's selective reporting of information over the years (e.g., the fact that the
performance criteria analyzed often change from year to year--for instance, R.O.E. in one year
and shareholder return the next) and its cross-sectional comparisons leave Fortune's conclusions
open to some skepticism and criticism.
A recent Johnson and Johnson study examined organizations with a corporate credo and
reported that they have performed better than those firms without one (Johnson and Johnson,
October 5, 1988)8. The company's CEO even claimed that a 35-year investment in a stock
portfolio made up 15 select fIrms with credos would have generated a return over four times
greater than that obtained by investing a like amount in a portfolio composed of the Dow Jones
Industrials. His analysis is, however, somewhat limited. A matched pairs control group was not
utilized, and other appropriate statistical controls were not employed. In addition, it does not
measure whether these fIrms actually adhere to the tenets set forth in their credos.
8Johnson and Johnson has had a credo since the 1947.
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Brouillard Communications (1988) also explored the relationship between reputation and
sales performance, via a survey of over 1,200 affluent customers, corporate executives, brokerage
research directors, and portfolio managers. They found that people are between two to three
times more likely to buy from or recommend the products of fIrms with "winning" reputations
(those with scores of 5 or 6 on their 0-6 point reputation scale). Furthermore, individuals
indicated that they would be nearly twice as likely to invest in companies with "winning"
reputations. This exploration has several noteworthy problems including: the use of unanchored
reputation scales and an arbitrary threshold for "winners," the use of hypothetical outcomes (as
opposed to actual corporate performance measures), and the ever so subtle punch line of the
report--that "winners" advertise more than "losers" (which brings the self-serving nature of
reports like this into focus).
Security analysts, particularly those attuned to the social investment theme, have also
examined the relationship between reputation and performance. For instance, shortly after the
publication of the 100 Best Companies to Work for in America (Levering et al., 1984) book,
Franklin R&D, a self-proclaimed socially conscious investment advisement group, compared the
lO-year performance of these "100 Best" companies with the Standard and Poors index (a
conventional measure of stock market performance). They found that the value of the "100 Best"
group rose 479% between 1975 and 1985 while the S&P 500 rose only 112% ansi~ht, 1985). In
a subsequent report, they opine that "positive work relations are a variable often overlooked by
traditional investors, but one that we think is key to economic health" (p. 1). In short, they
suggest that acting in a manner which merits inclusion on the "100 Best" list translates into
superior fmancial performance. Several caveats are in order. First, it is not clear that those fIrms
who made the "100 Best" list in 1984 would have been named to such a list in 1975, 1979, or
1982. Second, some of the fIrms in the "100 Best" list were not publicly traded during this
period. Finally, some fmns may appear in both the "best" and S&P indices being compared. If this
is the case, the sets are not mutually exclusive.
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Others in the investment community have analyzed the relationship between reputation
and performance as well. Investment Advisors at Dean Witter Reynolds. in a report entitled
"Socially Responsibly Investing: The Financial and SociolEconomic Issues," found that the
publicly traded "100 Best" companies outperformed the S&P 500 by 17.69% (cited in Levering,
1988, p. 259). This analysis shares many of the same criticisms. It is not clear whether some
companies reside in both groups. Furthermore, there are no justifications given for the time
period studied or the single performance measure used.
Kanter (1983), in her book The Chan~emasters, also examined the reputation-
performance relationship. She reported that the 47 firms deemed to be "progressive" on the
human resource management dimension significantly outperfonned a matched set of "non-
progressive" companies. She reports that this is a robust finding that held for a variety of fIrm
performance measures. Between 1976 and 1980, for instance, the return on equity for her
"progressive" firms (17.8%) was statistically, and economically, greater than that of the "non-
progressive" firms' (15.4%). By using the matched firms as a control group, Kanter's analysis
takes on some of the properties of a quasi-experiment Furthermore, by accounting for three
dimensions of HRM in her defmition of "progressiveness," the ability to invent. incorporate, and
promulgate human resource management innovations, she does a better job of measuring the
construct. She acknowledges, however, that her sample of "progressiveness" judges was severely
restricted. Only 65 (5%) of 1,250 executives, or executive teams, surveyed responded.
More recently, Kravetz (1988) derived his own means forranking firms according to their
HRM progressiveness. First, he sampled the Fortune 500 and an assortment of privately held
firms on their HRM policies and practices. Then, he divided the 150 companies who responded
into three groups according to his measure of human resource "progressiveness." In the end, he
concludes that "highly progressive" firms outperform "less progressive" firms on a number of
performance indicators including: five year sales growth (17.5% to 10.7%) and five year profit
growth (10.8% to 2.6%). Kravetz's methodology for categorizing companies on the HRM
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progressiveness dimension leaves his conclusions open to skepticism. First, he mailed surveys to
the Forbes 500 and to 42 financial institutions and received only 150 usable surveys. Then, he
arbittarily divided these self reports into three groups of 50. Lastly, he does not disclose the
representativeness of his sample and subgroups.
In sum, these contemporaneous analyses--though interesting and intuitively appealing--are
beset by some problems including: the validity and reliability of the categorization schemes, the
selective presentations of findings, and inappropriate, or nonexistent, controls. In spite of their
shortcomings, these investigations do offer some tenuous evidence to support the proposition that
reputation and performance go together.
Predictive Relationships
Recently, several studies have examined the reputation --performance hypothesis using
more appropriate research designs and statistical techniques. Take, for example, McGuire,
Schneeweis, and Branch (1990), who analyzed the relationships between lagged corporate
performance, corporate reputation, and subsequent corporate performance. They studied the
relationships between lagged performance (sales growth and market riskiness), reputation (as
reported in the Fortune survey), and subsequent performance. They found that lagged
performance explained 22% to 44% of the variance in reputation. When predicting subsequent
performance from present reputation, however, they reported that reputation explained no more
than 5% of the variance in subsequent performance.
Earlier, Sobol and Farrelly (1988) posited that reputation was a function of financial
performance and used lagged performance indicators to predict each of the eight Fortune
reputation dimensions individually. Earnings per share (E.P.S.), the price/earnings (p.E.) ratio,
net income (N.I.), and several other performance variables explained between 28.9% and 38.3%
of the variance in each of the eight "different" reputation scores. However, given that it has since
;..
been established that the Fortune measures load on a single factor (McGuire, Schneeweis, and
Branch, 1990, p. 170), the impact of these findings is diminished. Nevertheless, the results
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obtained for anyone of the measures support the general proposition that corporate reputation
and lagged perfonnance are related.
In a study that focused solely on one Fortune measure, social responsibility (SR), and its
effect on performance, McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) found that lagged SR
reputation had little effect on firm performance. In retrospect, given the high correlation (.78)9
between corporate reputation and SR reputationlOand the finding that corporate reputation has
little predictive power, it is not surprising that a relationship between SR reputation and corporate
performance was not detected.
Recently, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) moved the focus back to the determinants of
corporate reputation. In addition to the conventional financial and accounting determinants, they
added sets of institutional variables (including the firm's ownership profIle--institutions or
individuals, philanthropic contributions, size, quantity of media exposure, quality media exposure)
and strategic variables (advertising intensity, degree of diversification into unrelated businesses).
This elaborated reputation prediction model doubled the amount of variance explained from the
20% -40% range observed in the previous studies to between 43% - 60%. In the end, they claim
that their analysis was designed to "emphasize the social community within which firms
themselves are imbedded and the central role played by firms, constituents, and the media in
influencing the informational context within which reputation judgments are made" (p. 252).
It is clearly evident that business observers and academic researchers have considered and
explored the relationship between corporate reputation and corporate performance. Reporters in
the business press have centered on the contemporaneous relationship between reputation and
performance and reported a positive association. Researchers have used their models to
-."
9-rhe authors did not provide a correlation matrix in this study, but they did report that a factor analysis was done.
The .78 correlation value is what they reported in their subsequent study published in 1990.
IOrfoted on the previous page. Our factor analysis confirmed the single factor finding. We observed an
intercorrelation of .97 between HRM reputation, and overall reputation, the mean of the other seven measures.
Therefore, these measures are collinear, nearly singular. As such, it was impossible to parcel out the HRM
reputation component from overall reputation and treat the two as separate measures.
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reasonably predict corporate reputation from lagged corporate perfonnance. However,
identifying the relationship between reputation and current or future performance remains
problematic.
The limited empirical analyses, the apparent difficulty researchers have had in addressing
this problem, and the limited empirical analyses conducted to date served as the genesis for this
study, which has three goals. First, it reexamines the relationship between reputation signals and
corporate performance utilizing a number of new and previously untested reputation measures.
Second, it uses an improved, alternative methodology to explore the reputation --performance
relationship. Last, and most important, it addresses the neglected association between HR
reputation signals and corporate performance.
MODEL OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REPUTATION
Model
The reputation --performance model developed for this study examines the relationship
between HRM reputation and financial performance while controlling for the effects of corporate
reputation, human resource management performance, and corporate accounting performance.
(1) CPto - t+n =f(HRMRto, CRto, HRMPto, CPto)
where:
CPto -t+n = Corporate Financial Performance for a pre specified period (to -4n) succeeding
an HRM reputation signal.
HRMRto = Human Resource Management Reputation Signal(s) at to
CRto = Corporate Reputation Signal(s) at to
HRMPt-l =Human Resource Management Performance at Cl
CPt-l = Corporate Accounting Performance at C1
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Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are based on the theoretical, practical, and empirical literatures reviewed
previously, especially Spence's (1974) notion of signaling which suggests that a company's
reputation affects the behaviors of people facing decisions to join, invest in, or buy from an
organization. Moreover, both the anecdotal and research evidence suggest that favorable
reputations and positive outcomes are related. Screening theory (see: Stiglitz, 1975) and Fama's
(1980) labor market premise also support this contention. Indeed, Carmichael (1984) argues that
fIrms with favorable reputations will attract more, and better qualified, applicants (Carmichael,
1984).
Conversely, the literatures hold that an unfavorable reputation signal will have a negative
effect For instance, Munn (1983) implies that the value of a firm attributable to the goodwill it
engenders will decrease as a result of unfavorable reputation news. Furthermore, Pfeffer (1976)
posits that a fIrm with a poor reputation may have a more diffIcult time forming strategic alliances
with other institutions.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses examine the effects of reputation signals on
financial performance.
HI New, favorable (unfavorable) human resource management reputation signals at to
will have an immediate, positive (negative) effect on corporate performance at to and beyond.
H2 New, favorable (unfavorable) corporate reputation signals at to will have an
immediate, positive (negative) effect on corporate performance at to and beyond.
Socrates said, "The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to
appear." Perhaps HR performance, observable and measurable, is an antecedent to improved
fInancial performance, rather than the reputation glow of the organization. In other words, are
organizations that efficiently manage the relationships between sales, revenues, employee
".
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productivity, and labor cost the ones that are the most attractive to investors? Our third
hypothesis addresses the HR performance -- financial performance relationship.
H.3 Human resource peiformance (measured in terms of net income per employee) at
to will be positively related tofinancial performance (measured in terms of total shareholder
return) at to
METHODS, MEASURES, AND DATA
Methods
Two independent methodologies were used to test the reputation--performance
hypotheses. First, an ordinary least squares regression methodology was employed to estimate
the effects of lagged and concurrent HR reputation signals on an annualized measure of fmancial
performance, total shareholder return. This method was also used to study the effects of
corporate reputation signals and HR performance. In addition, an event study methodology was
utilized as a supplement to precisely examine the immediate impact of the HR and corporate
reputation signals on another fmancial measure, abnormal shareholder return. Abnormal returns
on the event day (or month) and the accumulated abnormal returns over several, post-event days
(or months) were computed, aggregated, and analyzed.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression. Multivariate OLS Regression was used to
analyze the relationships presented in the general model (eq. 1). This technique has also been
utilized in each of the empirical studies that have examined the reputation --performance
relationship to date (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; McGuire, Schneeweis, and Branch, 1990; and
Sobol and Farrelly, 1988).
In our study, a sequential, four-step, simultaneous approach was employed to predict
annual shareholder return. In Modell, several accounting-based measures of corporate
performance (CPn) and industry (1)type were introduced. In Model 2, a measure of HRM
performance (HRP), income per employee, was incorporated. In Model 3, several corporate
Reputation SignW~ iIIId Finn PetfOl1JW)Cl! 07107/91 23
reputation signals (CRn) were added. Finally, in Model 4, several HR reputation signals (HRRn)
were included. The complete model appears below:
(2) CPto =a + blCPl,t-l + b2CP2,t-l + b3CP3.t-l
+ b4HRPl,t-l
+ b5CRl,to + b6CR2,to + b7CR3.to + bgCR4.to + b9CR5,to
+ blOHRRl,to + bUHRR2,to + b12HRR3,to + b13HRR4,to + b14HRR5.to
+1+£
where:
CPto
CP 1,to
CP2, to
CP3,to
HRPl,to
CR 1,to
CR2,to
CR3,to
CR4,to
CR5,to
HRRl,to
HRR2,to
HRR3,to
HRR4 to,
= Total Shareholder Return
=Net Sales
= Total Assets
=Common Equity
=Income per Employee
= "In search of Excellence" Signal
= "Best Managed" Signal
= "Most Admired" Signal
= "Worst" Signal
= "Most Important" Signal
= "Best for Blacks" Signal
= "PrefeITed Employer" Signal
= "100 Best to Work For" Signal
="Best for Working Mothers" Signal
HRR5,to = "Best for Women" Signal
I = Industry
Recall that firm size is inherently controlled for, in that only the ten largest firms (as
measured in terms of annual sales) in each of thirty industries comprise the Fortune "most
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_. admired" sample. Also, note that industry type was controlled through the use of dummy
variables. The original thirty sectors were consolidated into 15 groUpS.ll
In accordance with HI> the regression coefficients forHRRl, HRR2' HRR3, HRR4,
HRRS, should be positive. Signaling theory and the efficient markets hypothesis both suggest that
once these favorable corporate reputation signals go public, they should have a positive effect on
finn perfonnance. Likewise, the correlation coefficients for CR1, CR2, CR3, CRS are expected
to be positive in accordance with H2. Clearly, all of these designations are favorable reputation
signals and, thus, should be positively associated with fmn performance.
Alternatively, the regression coefficient for CR4, the "worst company" signal, should be
negative in accordance with H2' which holds that unfavorable corporate reputation signals will be
associated with decreased financial performance.
In accordance with H3' the correlation coefficient for HRPI should be positive. Superior
HR performance should be related to superior fmancial performance.
Event Studies. To ascertain the effect of HRM reputation signals on the financial
perfonnance of the fmn more precisely, a widely accepted and applied financial economics
methodology known as the event study was adopted. Event studies have been used primarily to
study stock market reactions to news about a fmn or group of firms. Examples of event studies
include analyses of the effects of takeovers (on both the suitor and the target), stock repurchases,
and common or preferred stock offerings. 12
Essentially, the event study methodology isolates an "abnonnal" shareholder return
component, which has an expected value of zero. This abnormal component is simply the
difference between the actual change in share price and the predicted change on a given day,
where the predicted value is generated by modeling the performance of the security to that of the
stock market as a whole over some period preceding the event
lIThe industry sectors were grouped because of their natural tendency to compete in the same labor and capital
markets.
12See.for example.Jensen and Smith's (1985)summary.
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Recently, several researchers employed this technique to study human resource
management announcements. Abowd, Milkovich, and Hannon (1990) studied the effects of HRM
. ..
announcements, including newsworthy changes in compensation policies and staffing levels. They
found that shutdown and layoff announcements generated negative returns to shareholders. For
instance, in 1980, firms that experienced shutdowns realized a .56% decrease in their share prices
the day after these announcements.
Other examples of HRlIR related event studies have focused on: strikes (Neumann, 1980;
Becker and Olson, 1986; and Tracy, 1987, 1988), collective bargaining agreements (Abowd,
1989), executive succession outcomes (Etebari, Honigan, and Landwehr, 1987; Lubatkin, Chung,
Rogers, and Owers, 1989), and executive compensation plans (Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease,
1985; Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985).
All event studies incorporate five general steps (see: Bowman, 1983; Brown & Warner,
1980, 1985; and Schwert, 1981). They are (a) identification of the event(s) of interest, (b)
modeling the normal (expected) total shareholder return, (c) estimation of the abnormal
(unexpected) total shareholder return, (d) grouping of the abnormal returns, and (e) analysis of
abnormal return summary statistics.
Event Identification. An "event" may come in the form of a single action that affects all,
or a subset of, publicly traded firms. The enactment of a new equal employment regulation is one
example. Alternatively, certain event types, plant shutdowns for instance, affect many different
firms at many different times.
Regardless of the event type, it is imperative to accurately date the event Precise event
dating is essential because of the event study's reliance on the efficient markets hypothesis (Fama,
1970) which holds that stock returns are neither serially correlated nor serially cross-correlated.
Accordingly, on any given date, a sample of abnormal (unexpected) shareholder returns has a
predicted mean of zero. Similarly, the mean for a sample of cumulative abnonnal returns
(abnormal returns summed over a given period) should be zero.
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This study defines an event as the public announcement that an organization had been
included on one of the various "best company" lists that have emerged in the recent past. These
lists have been publicly disseminated in daily newspapers, monthly periodicals, occasional reports,
or books. Admittedly, some of these announcements may not emanate from the most reputable
or unbiased of sources. Moreover, the assertion that investors rely on some of these sources for
timely news may be a stretch. In addition, we recognize that the event windows for these events
may not be precisely specified. Note that these and the other limitations which affect this study
are addressed our concluding section.
To reiterate, if a study detects significant, positive (negative) abnormal (or cumulative
abnormal) returns for a company or group of companies when HRM reputation announcements
occur, then one can conclude that the market judged this information to be favorable
(unfavorable). These non-zero, abnormal returns may be attributed to the event alone, because
other influences on shareholder return are essentially controlled due to the aforementioned
absence of serial correlation and cross-correlation in stock market returns.
Modeling the normal (expected) shareholder return. To predict normal (expected)
shareholder returns for the event day (or month) and the so-called "window" of days (or months)
surrounding it, the total shareholder returns for the firm in a preceding period of days, or months,
are usually related to an index of total shareholder returns that represent the entire stock market
over the same period. Following convention, the market portfolio return for this study (the
baseline) is the New York Stock Exchange value-weighted portfolio, including dividends (Center
for Research in Security Prices, 1990). The intercept and slope were estimated over a I-year
period of 250 trading days, or 60 months for announcements in monthly periodicals, preceding the
event (the estimation period).
Estimation of the abnormal return. The intercept and slope parameters were then used
to predict shareholder returns for the day (month) of, and days (months) around, the event as a
function of market performance. In the daily analyses, the post-event windows were one, two,
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three, and four days long, and in the monthly analyses, they were one, two, and three months in
duration. As is the case for most event studies, the price per share was adjusted to reflect the
..
effects of stock splits and stock dividends.
Grouping of the abnormal returns. Average cumulative abnormal returns (average
CARs) were also calculated for each sample. In accordance with hypotheses HI and H2' afirm
that experiences a favorable reputation signal (e.g., being named one of America's "five best
managed" firms) is expected to realize a statistically and economically significant positive
abnormal return on or around the event day (month). Conversely, an unfavorable reputation
signal (e.g., being named one of America's ten "worst" companies) is expected to result in a
statistically and economically significant, negative abnormal return for the firm 13.
Likewise, in accordance with hypotheses HI and H2, the average abnormal return for a
group of firms experiencing a favorable reputation signal is expected to be positive and both
statistically and economically significant Conversely, the average abnormal return for a group of
firms experiencing an unfavorable reputation signal is expected to be negative and both
statistically and economically significant
In the end, the event study model accounts for all of the requisite elements presented in
Equation 1. Through the capture of the abnormal component of the change in stock price--which
is attributable to the announcement alone, the relationship between the disclosure of a reputation
signal and subsequent performance may be ascertained.
Measures
0 LS Regression. The dependent variable in the OLS analyses, corporate performance,
was defined in terms of annual total shareholder return. Total shareholder return was measured as
a percentage and computed as follows:
,..F. 13The relationship between HRM performance,income per employee. and financial performance addressed by HS
was not tested using the event study methodology.
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(14) TSRto = DividendstO + (Share Priceto-Share Pricet-l)
Share Pricet-l
where:
TSRto =Total Shareholder Return
DividendstO 14 =Dividends paid during the year
Share pricet-llS =Beginning share price
Share priceto16 =Ending share price
Net Sales, Total Assets, and Common Equity, three accounting-based, corporate
performance measures, and Industry served as the control variables in the OLS analyses. Net
Sales17(CP1) was included to further control for the effects offlrm size. Recall that flrm size is
already partially controlled because the finns that make up this sample are the ten largest in their
respective industries. Total Assets18(CP2) and Common Equity19(CP3) were included to control
for the financial capital of the finn.
Included among the independent variables are the eleven reputation signals listed in Table
3 and briefly described below.
14Computation using Compustat data items: Data26/Data27. (Dividends per share/Adjustment Factor.)
15Computation using Compustat data items Data24/Data27. (Share Price/Adjustment Factor.)
16Computation using Compustat data items Lag Data24/Lag Data26. (Lagged Share Price/Adjustment Factor.)
17Compustat data item 12. "This item represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for
regular sales completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts. trade discounts. and returned sales and
allowances for which credit is given to customers."
18Compustat data item 6. "This item represents cunent assets plus net plant plus other non-current assets
(including intangible assets. deferred items. and investments and advances)."
19Compustat data item 60. "This item represents the common shareholders interest in the company."
TABLE 3 Reputation signals examined in OLS analyses.
Year
Signal 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
HR RepQtation
"Best for Blacks" New Carry Carry Carry New Carry Carry
"Most Preferred" New Carry New Carry New Carry New
"100 Best to Work For" New Carry Carry Carry Carry
"Best for Working Mothers" New New New
"Best for Women" New
"Best for Black Engineers" Future
Corporate ReVlltation
"Excellent" New Carry Carry Carry Carry Carry Carry
"Best Managed" New New New New New New New
"Most Admired" New New New New New New
"Worst" New Carry Carry Carry Carry
"Most Important" New
New--New Reputation Signal, C-.Carryover Reputation Signal, F --First Occurrence, 1989
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In August of 1982, and again in February 1986, Black EnteI:prisemagazine published a
list of the 25 best finns for blacks in an article entitled, "In Good Company: 25 Best Places for
Blacks to Work" (Black EnteI:prise, 1982; 1986).
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In March of 1982, Graduatin~ En~neer magazine published a list of the 25 most preferred
companies among engineering students (Graduatin~ En~neer. March 1982). Generated every
March in even numbered years thereafter, the most recent of these lists was published in 1990.
On May 6, 1984, the New York Times published a partia11istof those companies cited in
the book, The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America (Levering et al., 1984), which had
recently been published.
In October of 1986, Working Mother magazine listed 30 fInns that comprised its fIrst
annual survey of "The Best Companies for Working Mothers" (p. 25). Its most recent list was
published in October, 1990. In addition, on September 20, 1989, the Wall Street Journal
published the names of the top 10 fInns for working mothers according to the 1989 survey.
On April 25, 1988, USA Today published the complete list of those companies that had
been cited in the book, The Best Companies for Women (Zietz & Dusky, 1988). One company,
Proctor & Gamble, was also cited in a Wall Street Journal article of December 21, 1988, as being
in jeopardy of losing this designation.
In November of 1989, National Society of Black En~eers magazine published a list of
the 100 fInDs deemed the best for black engineers (N.S.B.E., 1989).
The In Search of Excellence designation (Peters and Watennan, 1984) was the earliest
overall corporate reputation signal studied using OLS. An "excellent" company list was not
found in the popular press, though, so this signal was not studied using the event study
methodology.
Since 1972, Dun's Business Month has selected fIve companies each year and tabbed them
the "best managed" (Business Month, December 1972-88).
Likewise, Fortune's (1983-1988) annual "Most Admired' scores were included in the OLS
analyses, but these announcements were not studied using the event study methodology.2O
2Ofombrun and Shanley (1990) have found significant abnormal returns for those firms at the high and low
extremes of the rankings around the dissemination of this information.
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In June of 1985, Mother Jones magazine published a list of the "best" and "worst"
companies (Mother Jones, June 1985). An article listing the 10 best finns also appeared in the
Wall Street Journal on May 6, 1985.
On June 6, 1988, management expen Tom Peters made public his choices for America's
"most important" companies (peters, June 6, 1988).
The other explanatory variable included in the OLS analyses was a measure of HR
performance, income per employee (HRP1)' This was measured in dollars and computed as
follows:
(5) Income per Employee = Net Income
Employees
where:
Net Income21 =Annual Net income
Employees22 =Total employees
Event Studies. The dependent variable in the event studies was abnormal total
shareholder return. Values were computed for the event day (month) itself and over several
windows, as long as 4 days (or 3 months) after the event. Recall that the abnormal return is the
difference between the fInn's actual return for the day and its predicted value for that day. Also,
note again that the design of the event study effectively controls for any influences other than the
change attributable to the release of the new infonnation, the reputation signal.
Table 4 highlights the independent variables. six HR and four corporate reputation signals,
examined using the Event Study methodology--which isolates the immediate effects of new
21Compustat data item 20. "This item represents income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations
less preferred dividend requirements and is adjusted for the additional dollar savings due to common stock
~uiValents as outlined in Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 15."
2 Compustat data item 29. "This item represents the number of company workers as reported to shareholders."
TABLE 4 Reputation signab examined in event studies.
Year
Signal 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
HR R~putation
"Best for Blacks" New
--- --- ---
New
--- --- ---
"Most Preferred" New
---
New
---
New
---
New
-
"100 Best to Work For" New
--- --- --- --- ---
"Best for Working Mothers" New New New New
"Best for Women" New --
"Best for Black Engineers" New
Corporate Reputation
"Best Managed" New New New New New New New
---
"Best" New
--- -- --- ---
"Worst" New
--- --- --- ---
"Most Important" New
---
New--New Reputation Signal. -- No new signal this year
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reputation signals on stock prices, in conttast to the OLS analyses that focus on the ~ in which
these signals were released.
Data
OLS Regression. The data used in the OLS analyses were fonned when infonnation
from a variety of primary data sources was collected and combined. The key variable used to
merge these data was the fmn-specific, Center for Unifonn Security Pricing identifier, the CUSIP.
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.- First, corporate reputation scores for the period 1985-1989 were obtained through a
private agreement with Fortune. These data, which include reputation scores for about 300 fInns,
serve as the core for the OLS analyses.23 They were reduced when only those fInns with
complete data for all the performance measures were retained Corporate reputation, as defIned
by Fortune, is the equally weighted mean of the eight measures. Second, a set of descriptive
reputation assessments, originally developed for those participants in various labor, investment,
and product markets, produced dichotomous measures (I, included, and 0, excluded) for the HR
and Corporate reputation signals. Third, fIrm-level corporate and human resource management
performance measures were extracted from Standard and Poors' COMPUST AT data. Then, the
three subsets were merged by CUSIP to form the comprehensive reputation-performance
database.
Data for the fIscal years 1982-1988 were analyzed using ordinary least squares regression.
Complete data were available for between one-half and three-quarters of the approximately 300
fIrms in each of the annual Fortune data sets.
Event Studies. The event study data were obtained from a stock returns data base
compiled and maintained by the Center for Uniform Security Pricing at the University of Chicago.
Once again, the fIrm-specifIc CUSIP served as the key variable and it was used to extract the
requisite information for each company.
The event study sample sizes are a function of three things: the number of firms afforded a
particular "best" designation, whether these fInns are publicly traded, and the exchange on which
they are traded. One complication is the fact that many of the finns named to these various "best"
lists are not publicly traded. Boston's Beth Israel Hospital, which has been frequently recognized
(Workin~ Mother, 1990; Zemke and Schaaf, 1989), is one such example. Accordingly, some of
the samples were smaller than the original lists from which they were drawn. The most extreme
23The ten largest ftnns in 30 industries are rated each year. With movements on and off these lists the reputations
of some 477 entities were ratedat one time or another between 1983 and 1990.
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example of this is the list of "America's Ten Best Companies" that appeared in Mother Jones
(June, 1985) and the Wall Street Journal (May 6,1985) where only two of the ten "best
companies," Kollmorgen and Wang, were publicly traded on the NYSE at the time of this
announcement
On the other hand, data were available for all but a few companies for many of the
reputation signals, especially those that recognize the largest fmns. For example, data were
available for sixty-eight of the seventy-five companies afforded Dun's Business Month's best
managed designation over the 25 year period.
In total, fifteen event studies were conducted. The results from the 52 primary tests, two
of which (4%) were significant at the .05 level, and the results from the OLS analyses follow. 24
RESULTS
OLS Analyses
Descriptive Statistics. Recall that the time periods under study in the OLS section of this
analysis are the fiscal years 1982-1988. In 1988, the requisite data were available for 226 of the
305 firms in Fortune's "most admired" survey.
In the 1988 sample, the companies range from the likes of Merck, named to the "100 Best
Companies to Work For," "Best Companies for Women," and "Best Companies for Working
Mothers" lists and named the "most admired," to Bank America Financial Corp., absent from all
the reputation signals' lists and named the "least admired." In between, there are firms like
24Jne results for all of the event studies conducted, some 121 in total, are available from the authors. Analyses
were also conducted to ascertain whether the public recognition of a.b companies on a "best list" would prompt
investors to obtain the entire list and revalue all the rums included on the original list We found that all
companies did not benefit from the recognition of a few. In addition, we tested to see whether events easily pinned
to a certain ~ might have had an impact throughout the !lli2D.1hor over several months thereafter. This was not
the case.
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Monsanto, which did not make any of the "best" lists but did garner an average "most admired"
score.
Table 5 provides select descriptive statistics for the 1982-1988 samples. In 1988, average
annual total shareholder return was 18.45% and the median shareholder return was 15.82%.
Note that this compares to the median return for Fortune's Industrial 500, 14.10%, during the
same period.
The median sales level for the 1988 sample was $4.804 billion. Median assets were
$4.664 billion and median common equity was $1.571 billion. Between 1982 and 1988, the
sample's median sales ranged from $3.558 billion to $5.378 billion. During the same period,
assets ranged between $2.972 billion and $4.888 billion. Likewise, equity varied from $1.256
billion to $2.168 billion. The lowest values for each of these variables came in 1982 then they
peaked in 1983, dipped in 1984, and steadily climbed through 1988.
Recall that HR was measured in terms of income per employee. The median income per
employee for the 1988 sample was $7,290; and between 1982 and 1988, this measure ranged
between $4,790 and $7,290.
One of the corporate reputation signals examined was Fortune's corporate reputation
score, which averaged 6.35 on a lO-point scale in 1988. This variable was very stable during
this seven-year period. It ranged between 6.33 and 6.51.
--
TABLE 5 Select descriptive statistics for 1988.19821.
Variables 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982
Total Shareholder moo. 15.82% 3.30% 18.98% 28.63 1.90% 25.11% 30.56
Return (TSR %) mean 18.45% 5.31% 16.97% 31.11% 2.80% 28.38% 37.59
s.d. (27.50%) (33.24%) (27.22%) (26.48%) (21.65%) (28.66%) (56.00)
Total Shareholder med. 14.10% 6.60% 15.50% 26.31 % -.75% 30.21% 21.22%
Return Fortune 500
Industrials (TSR %)
Fortune "Most med. 6.38 6.35 6.41 6.59 6.41 6.29 na
Admired"
score (0-10 scale) mean 6.35 6.33 6.35 6.51 6.44 6.25 na
s.d. (.93) (.91) (.87) (.81) (.83) (.93) na
HRM Perfonnance med. 7.29 6.11 5.61 5.57 5.77 5.22 4.79
Income/employee mean 7.84 7.39 6.62 7.55 9.14 7.44 6.51
($ thousands) s.d. (55.17) (14.82) (12.44) (12.05) (15.16) (10.25) (I1.Rl)
Net Sales med. 4,804 4,851 4,631 5,024 5,010 5,378 3,558
($ millions) mean 7,772 7,797 7,455 9,330 9,149 9,592 6,593
s.d. (10,018) (11,022) (10,543) (15,047) (14,820) (14,787) (12,244)
Total Assets med. 4,664 4,272 3,915 4,091 4,025 4,888 2,972
($ millions) mean 12,000 11,315 10,981 11,996 11,189 12,178 7,696
s.d. (18,634) (17,795) (17,921) (19,122) (17,827) (17,338) (13,922)
Common Equity med. 1,571 1.462 1,374 1,764 1,782 2,168 1,256
($ millions) mean 2,823 2,907 2,999 3,356 3,196 3,582 2,313
s.d. (4,331) (4,502) (4,581) (5,177) (4,717) (4,911) (3,887)
Sample Size n 226 227 211 167 164 135 135
1All frnancials are in tenns of 1988 dollars.
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Table 6 highlights the correlations among the accounting and fmandal perfonnance
indicators, interval measures, and the corporate reputation variable, an ordinal measure, for
198825. The dichotomous reputation signals, of course, are not presented in this table.
25Tables 8.3a through 8.3f (for the years 1987-1982) are available from the authors.
TABLE 6 Correlations among reputation and performance for 1988.
"Most Income! Net Total Common
Variables TSR Admired" employee Sales Assets Equity
Total Shareholder 1
Return (TSR)
Fortune "Most -.117 1
Admired" score
HRM Perfonnance 228 217 1
Income/employee
Net Sales .032 .176 .091 1
Total Assets .172 .031 .124 .581 1
Common Equity -.011 .283 .121 .852 .562 1
n =226 p < .05 when r > .17
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Unexpectedly and contrary to conventional wisdom, Fortune's corporate reputation signal
was invariant with Total Shareholder Return in 1988.26 As hypothesized, however, the fIrst order
cotrelation between HR performance and Total Shareholder Return was positive and significant
(r=.228).27 In spite of the volatile and sometimes counterintuitive relationship between Fortune's
corporate reputation signal and corporate perfonnance, this reputation signal was positively
related to HR perfonnance (r=.217). Finally, the relationships among the three accounting-based
perfonnance measures were significant and positive as expected The association between assets
26rhe relationship between corporate reputation and total shareholder return was evaluated for the years 1983-
1987. It appears that this relationship has fluctuated over the years. It was significant and negative in 1983, not
significant in 1984 and 1985, positive and significant in 1986, and not significant in 1987. Previous studies, the
most recent of which have used data only as recent as 1985 (McGuire, Schneeweis, and Branch, 1990) and 1986
(Fombron and Shanley, 1990), understandably have not picked up on this. All to say, the relationship between the
Fortune reputation measure and performance is unstable. Maybe it is not the enduring characteristic it has been
asserted to be.
27This was the case in each of the years between 1984 and 1988. In 1983, however, a surprising negative
relationship (r=-.244) was observed.
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and equity (r=.56Z), assets and sales (r=.581), and equity and sales (r=.85Z), all attest to the
widely acknowledged interdependencies among these variables.28
Inferential Analyses. Recall that a sequential approach was adopted for this study.
Table 7 highlights the results obtained for 198829. Note that the four models examine the same
dependent variable, annual total shareholder return, and each one builds upon its predecessor.
In Modell, several accounting-based performance measures and industry type were
regressed against financial performance. In Model 2, a human resource performance measure was
incorporated. In Model 3, several corporate reputation signals were added. In Model 4, our
completed model, various HR reputation signals were included.
Recall the first hypothesis, New,favorable (unfavorable) human resource management
reputation signals at to will have an immediate, positive (negative) effect onfinancial
peifonnance at to and beyond. Contrary to signaling theory, the favorable HRM reputation
signals studied, be they concurrent or lagged, were not positively related to corporate
performance. Therefore, hypothesis H1 was not supported.
Hearken back to the second hypothesis, New,favorable (unfavorable) corporate
reputation signals at to will have an immediate, positive (negative) effect onfinancial
peifonnance at to. Unexpectedly, neither Fortune's corporate reputation signal (J2= -0450,
1.=-1.91, 12-=.058),nor any of the other corporatereputationsignals,werepositivelyrelated to
financial performance in 1988. Therefore, HZ was not supported.
28Very similar relationships were detected in each of the other years under study (1982-1987). It appe.ars that
these are stable relationships.
29,-ables 8.4a through 8Af (for the years 1987-1982) are available from the authors.
TABLE 7 The relationship between fIR repulatlon, corporate repulatloo, fIR performance, and -.-ate perforRWlCe181981.
" Explanatory Variables Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
"Best Blacks" -.0104(. ) (. ) (. ) (.0929)
"Most ~erRd" .0131
(. ) (. ) (. ) (.0994)
"100 Best" .0088(. ) (. ) (. ) (.0581)
"Best for Working Mothers" .0148
(. ) (. ) (. ) (.1079)
"Best for Women" -.0555
(. ) (. ) (. ) (.0789)
"Excellent" .0001 .0000
(. ) (. ) (.0578) (.0616)
"Best Managed" .0625 .0727(. ) (. ) (.1425) (.1475)
"Most Admired" -.0449 + -.0450
(. ) (. ) (.0226) (.0236)
"Worst" -.0841 -.0935(. ) (. ) (.1400) (.1427)
"Most hnportant" -.0982 -.0871(. ) (. ) (.1389) (.1510)
Income per Employee .0012... .0013... .0013...(. ) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Sales .07E-5 -.11E-5 -.1<&5 -.06E-5
(.41E-5) (.400-5) (.4<&5) (.43E-5)
Assets .72E.5++ .72E-5+++ .64E-5++ .65E-5++
(.22E-5) (.21E-5) (.21E-5) (.22B-5)
Equity -1.5E-5 -1.5E-5 -1.1£.5 -1.0&5
(.86E-5) (.84E-5) (.89&5) (.92&5)
Intercept .1717 .1704+ .4471++ .4449++
(.0872) (.0850) (.1630) (.1964)
FIR2 2.68/.111 3.29/.155 2.8W.155 2.1:7/.136
OBS 226 226 226 226
+ p < .05t~iled ++p < .01two-tailed +++P < .001two-boiled .P< .05one-tailed .. P < .01 ~-- P< .001ooe-tai1ed
Modell: CPto-a+blCP1.t-1 +b2CP2,t.1+b3CP3,t.1 +1+£
Model2: CPto-a+bICPI,t.1 +b2CP2,t-1+b3CP3,t.1+b4HRPI,t-1++1+£
Model3 : CPto-a +blCPl,t-1 +b2CP2,t.1+b3CP3,t-1+b4HRPI,t-1+bPI.to +bp2,to +bP3.... +bSCR4,to+b9CRS"" +1+ £
Model4 : CPto-a +bICP1.t~CP2,t.1 +b~ +b4HRP~bSCRI,to +b~to +b~+"P4,ID +b9C1ls....
+blO I,to+ bU to+bl2 ,to+bI3HRMR4,to+b14 ....+1+£
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Prior to this study, researchers, using earlier data and not controlling for any other
reputation signals found a slight positive correlation between corporate reputation and corporate
perfonnance (McGuire, Branch, & Schneeweis, 1990).
The Effect of HRM Performance
Organizations that control costs and increase productivity simultaneously can be expected
to reap greater profits in both the short and long term. This adage is reflected in our hypothesis
addressing to HR performance, Human resource management performance (measured in terms
of net income per employee) at to will be positively related to financial performance (measured
in terms of total shareholder return) in the same period (to). As expected, we found that HR
performance was positively related to fmandal performance (12=.0013,1=3.66,12=.0003).
In short, for the "average" company in this sample, doubling of the income per employee,
from $7,290 to $14,380 (a .13 standard deviation change) should result in a 9.47 point increase in
total shareholder return, from 18.45% to 27.92%. This positive and significant relationship was
observed in five of the seven years studied. The results for the HR performance variable over the
last five years support H3. The ramifications of this fmding are discussed in further detail in our
concluding section.
Event Studies
Recall that the event study methodology controls right up to the event day (or month) for
industry, accounting performance, HR perfonnance, and corporate reputation. Accordingly,
only the first two hypotheses, the reputation signaling hypotheses, were examined in the event
study analyses.
As depicted in Table 8, a plethora of evidence for a positive relationship between
favorable HRM reputation signals and financial performance was not detected using the event
study methodology. Indeed, five of the six HRM reputation signals proved to be invariant with
financial performance.
TABLE 8 Abnormal Shareholder Returns for the Reputation Signals
Reputation Signal Release Returns (firms) Period Period Period Period
0 0 to +1 0 to +2 0 to +3
HR Reputation
Best Companies for Blacks Feb. 1982 monthly (30) .0291 .0320 .0207
---
Feb. 1986 (.0230) (.0325) (.0398)
--
Engineers'Top 25 Preferred Mar. 1982,84 monthly (80) -.0232 -.0085 -.0045
--
Employer Mar. 1986,88 (.0172) (.0243) (.0298)
---
100 Best Companies to Work For 6 May 1984 daily (15) .0023 .0095 .0091 .0063
(.0060) (.0085) (.0104) (.0120)
Best Companies for Working Aug. 1986, 87 monthly (74) .0270* .0233 .0484*
---
Mothers Oct. 1988, 89 (.0151) (.0213) (.0262)
---
Best Companies for Working 20 Sep. 1989 daily (4) .0064 .0066 .0400 .0091
Mothers (.0070) (.0099) (.0122) (.0141)
Best Companies for Women 25 Apr. 1988 daily (24) .0008 .0036 .0071 .0245
(.0104) (.0147) (.0180) (.0208)
Best Companies for Women - 21 Dec. 1988 daily (1) .0043 .0088 .0066 .0023
Threatened Removal (.0100) (.0142) (.0174) (.0200)
Best Companies for Black Nov. 1989 monthly (67) -.0010 .0277 -.-
---
Engineers (.0217) (.0301)
--- --
Corporate Reputation
America's Five Best Managed Dec. 1982-88 monthly (66) .0091 -.0496 -.0492 --
Companies (.0237) (.0335) (.0410) --
America's Best Companies June 1985 monthly (2) -.0244 -.0578 -.0306 -.-
(.0818) (.1157) (.1417)
--
America'sWorst Companies June 1985 monthly (10) .0135 -.0170 -.0212
---
(.0294) (.0416) (.0510)
--
America's Best Companies 6 May 1985 daily (2) ..0170 -.0212 .0095 .0180
(.0220) (.0311) (.0381) (.0440)
America's Most Important 6 June 1988 daily (10) .0114 .0396* .0416 .0315
Companies (.0143) (.0203) (.0248) (.0286)
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One noteworthy relationship, however, was observed. Those fInns named as the "Best for
Working Mothers" between 1986 and 1989 realized an unexpected return of2.7%, on average, in
the month that these announcements were made U=I.79, U<.05). During the period that
encompassed the event month and the next 2 months thereafter, these fInns realized an
unexpected 4.84% increase in their stock (1=1.85,U<.05),on average. This is the only signal
whose results support hypothesis HI.
Evidence for a negative relationship between unfavorable HRM reputation signals and
fInancial performance was not detected for the one signal studied. The announced threat, in the
Wall Street Journal (December 21, 1988), that Proctor and Gamble might be eliminated from
future editions of the Best Companies for Women (Zietz and Dusky, 1988) for failing to promote
a woman to a vice presidential post, had no effect on the fIrm's stock price-- on the day of the
announcement or over any period surrounding the announcement. This finding does not support
the negative relationship outlined in Hypothesis HI'
Similarly, evidence for a positive relationship between favorable corporate reputation
signals and fIrm performance was not detected using the event study technique. Indeed, two of
the three corporate favorable reputation signals were invariant with corporate perfonnance.
One confmnatory relationship, however, was observed. Those fIrms cited in Tom Peters'
syndicated column identifying "America's Most Important Companies" (peters, June 6,1988)
realized a positive, significant U=1.97, U<.05) change in their share prices on the order of 2.6%
the day after this column appeared. In the window that encompassed the event day (to) and 1
trading day thereafter (tl)' the share prices for these companies increased 3.96%, on average
U=1.95, U<.05). Although this fmding supports Hypothesis H2, the other corporate reputation
signals did not provide any additional support for this hypothesis.30
30A subsequent analysis of Peters' weekly column in its fJlSt year of existance. 1985, detected no relationship
between a fIrm's being mentioned and the accumulation of positive abnormal returns to its shareholders.
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Evidence for a negative relationship between an unfavorable corporate reputation signal
and financial perfonnance was not detected either. Being named as one of America's 10 Worst
companies in Mother Jones (June, 1985) had no effect on these finns' stock prices in the event
month or any window of pre- or post-event months. This fmding does not support Hypothesis
H2.
To summarize, the results of this study provide little evidence to suggest that favorable
reputation signals are positively related to corporate perfonnance; thus, neither HI, New,
favorable (unfavorable) human resource management reputation signals at to will have an
immediate, positive (negative) effect on financial performance at to and beyond, nor H2' New,
favorable (unfavorable) corporate reputation signals at to will have an immediate, positive
(negative) effect on financial performance at to' were supported. The vast majority of favorable
reputation signals were not positively associated with the fmancial performance of the finn. Nor
did the few unfavorable reputation signals that were examined produce any evidence whatsoever
to suggest that they are negatively related to shareholder returns.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence from this study suggests that the relationship between reputation and
corporate performance is a tenuous at best, and more likely, nonexistent Only two of ten signals
were at all related to changes in shareholder value. Frequently, corporate and HRM reputation
signals had no effect on corporate perfonnance whatsoever. Table 9 summarizes the fmdings of
this study. Relationships in the expected direction were observed for only one HR and one
corporate reputation signals.
os (1982-88) os (1982.1988)
os (1982-88) ns (1982.1984.1986.1988)
ns (1984-88) ns (1985)
ns (1986-88) pos (1986.1987,1988)
ns (1988) ns (1988)
--
ns (1989)
ns (1982-88)
--
ns (1982-88) ns (1982-88)
mix (1983-88)
--
ns (1985-88) ns (1985)
--
ns (1985)
ns (1988) pos (1988)
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TABLE 9 Summary of rmdings for the prediction of corporate performance.
Methodology
Explanatory Variables O.L.s. E.s.
ARM Reputation Si~nal'i
"Best for Working Mothers"
"Best for Blacks"
"Most Preferred"
"100 Best to Work For"
"Best for Women"
"Best for Black Engineers"
Corporate Reputation SiV131s
"Best Managed"
"Excellent"
"Most Admired"
"Worst"
"Best"
"Most Important"
HR Perfonnance
Income per Employee pos (1983-88) -
ns -no significant rtdationship tht«~d pos -significant positiv~ r~lotionship mix -significant pos. and lief. r~lationships
Table 10 focuses on the most important explanatory variable identified in this study, HR
perfonnance. Over a five-year period, a significant positive relationship between HRM
perfonnance and financial perfonnance is evident
:: TABLE 10 Summary of findings for HRM performance as an explaDatory variable. 1
Year
1988 1987 1986 1985 19S4 1983 1982
HR Perfonnance beta .0013*** .0035* .0090*** .0051** .0040*** -.0053 .0063
(Standard Error) (.0003) (.0016) (.0018) (.0021) (.0011) (.0031) (.0053)
Avg. HR Perf. ($) 7,840 7,390 6,620 7,550 9,140 7,440 6,270
Std. Deviation ($) 55,170 14,820 12,440 12,050 15,160 10,250 10,130
Avg. T.S.R. (%) 18.45% 5.31% 16.97% 31.11% 2.80% 28.38% 37.59%
Amount of a.1 5,517 1,482 1,244 1,205 1.516
std. deviation 7.18% 5.20% 12.00% 6.16% 6.08%
change in HRM
perfonnance($) and
predicted change
in T.S.R. (%)
Amount of a .25 13,792 3,705 3,110 3,013 3.790
std. deviation 17.9% 13.0% 30.0% 15.4% 15.2%
change in HRM
perfonnance ($) and
predicted change
in T.S.R. (%)
Amount of a .50 27,585 7,410 6,220 6,025 7.580
std. deviation 35.8% 26.0% 60.0% 30.8% 30.4%
change in HRM
perfonnance ($) and
predicted change
in T.S.R. (%)
*
p < .05 one-tail. ** p < .01 one-tail. *** p < .001 one-tail
1 Estimated using the comprehensive model. Model 4. which includes accounting performance. HRM
performance. corporate reputation. and HRM reputation. (see pg. )
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For example, were the "average" company in this sample to have improved its income per
employee value by .1 standard deviation in 1988, its total shareholder return would have increased
from 7.18 points, from 18.45% to 25.63%; nearly a 40% increase. If the same were true in 1987,
the increase would have been 5.20 points, nearly a 100% increase from 5.31% to 10.51%.
TABLE 11 Summary of hypothesis tests.
HYPOTHESES OLS EVENT STUDIES
ARM Renutation
HI New,favorable HRM reputation signals No Support Weak Support
will have an immediate, positive effect "Best for Working Mothen"
on corporate performance.
New, unfavorable HRM reputation signals Not Tested No Support
will have an immediate, negative effect
on corporate performance.
Cornorate Renutation
H2 New,favorable corporate reputation No Support Weak Support
signals will have an immediate, positive ''Most Important"
effect on corporate performance.
New, unfavorable corporate reputation No Support No Support
signals will have an immediate, negative
effect on corporate performance.
ARM Perfonnance
H3 Human resource management performance Strong Support Not Tested
will be positively related to corporate 1Dcomc per Employee
performance.
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In that we control for the fInn's other resources, its assets, equity, sales, and reputation,
the most telling result of this study is our fInding that companies who generate more income with
fewer people will reap sizable rewards.
Table 11 summarizes our results which: (1) provide a shred of tenuous evidence for the
theoretical notion that reputation matters to corporations and their shareholders, (2) call into
question the conjecture of the business press--where it is held that reputation influences
perfonnance, and (3) build upon the fIndings derived in the previous empirical analyses.
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In the final analysis, maybe it is lJQ1."better to look good than to feel good." In this study,
the "look good" signals demonstrated little, if any, association with corporate performance. On
the other hand, one measure of efficiency and healthiness, HR performance, did emerge as a
useful predictor of financial success. To be sure, this study raises some new research issues and,
more fundamentally, generates some questions about the theoretical underpinnings it relied upon.
Quite simply, these results call into question the appropriateness of applying signaling
theory and the efficient markets hypothesis to the reputation-performance problem. In the end,
numerous favorable reputation signals did not generate positive shareholder returns on or around
their release date or in the fiscal year in which they were released.
Recall that signaling theory suggests that in the absence of complete and accurate
information, decision makers rely on observable factors, or signals, as substitutes; and the
efficient markets hypothesis holds that stock prices reflect all available information. The
designations identified and isolated in this study, if they are meaningful reputation signals that
provide new information, should influence stock prices. Most of the new reputation signals,
however, did not have either an immediate or even a delayed effect on share prices. This finding
raises at least two questions: When is a signal not a signal, and when will it have no effect
whatsoever on stock prices?
Perhaps, a signal is not a signal when it emanates from an ill-informed or self-interested
source. This may be the case for the reputation signals studied here, many of which emanate from
consultants, journalists, or some combination thereof. All to say, the quality of a signal may
determine its power.
A simpler explanation is that these ostensibly new signals are really old news. The
increased attention to human resource management of late has led to a proliferation of
information regarding the policies and practices of organizations. Perhaps, the information
marketplace has simply become overloaded
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Of course, the results of this study do not refute signaling theory or the efficient markets
hypothesis altogether. They do, however, seem to suggest that the quality of reputation signals
varies and that some reputation signals, even those that have face validity, may amount to
nothing more than noise in an already loud arena.
Merits to this Study- The fim contribution of this work is the introduction of the
concept of HR reputation. This led to the development of a general model of HR reputation that
we tested using ordinary least squares regression and an event study methodology. The second
contribution of this study is the fact that it moves beyond describing HR reputation to an
examination of the contemporaneous relationship between HR reputation and corporate
performance using widely accepted, rigorous scientific methods. The use of the event study
methodology to address this problem is our third contribution. Previous examinations into this
issue have only examined the effect of reputation signals on annual shareholder return using OLS
regression that does not isolate and calculate the immediate effects of these or other signals. A
fuID1hcontribution of this study is its reliance on multiple measures of reputation. Prior to this,
researchers have only utilized Fortune's single item measure of corporate reputation. Here, ten
reputation signals, six HR and four corporate, were identified, isolated, and tested.
Limitations of this Study. It is imperative to note some of the inherent shortcomings
with the reputation signals studied; especially those which may diminish the likelihood of
detecting a relationship between reputation and performance. Broadly speaking, the limitations
of this study can be placed in two categories: issues surrounding the genesis of these reputation
signals and their dissemination.
One liability that affects some of these reputation signals, the Fortune "most admired"
assessment for instance, is the fact that the reputation measures are not independent 31 In
31This assertion is based on a review of the limited infonnation provided by the WSI, a partial report for the third
quarter of 1989 that the author obtained from the Editors of the Journal. It consists of the fIrSt three pages
(Introduction, About this Survey, and Respondent ProfIle) and the survey results (twelve different points in time--
two per year over a six year period) for one anonymous company.
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addition, the criteria, criterion weights, and scores that distinguish winners from losers may be
amorphous, selectively divulged, or withheld altogether. For example, it wasn't until Dun's 1987
report (Business Month, December 1987) that both the criteria (profit growth, size, operating
efficiency, reputation, and corporate strategy) and the judges (a panel of 20 business experts)
were revealed for the very first time.
In addition, some of these "best" lists are solely the outgrowth of their originators'
subjective judgments. Peters' "most important" list is obviously such a case. It is devoid of
uniform measures. Another criticism leveled against some of these lists is that they lack face
validity. Their members appear to be 1Q.Qdifferent on 1Q.Qmany dimensions to be grouped
together.
Moreover, in certain cases, the purveyors of these lists stand to gain from including certain
companies on them (e.g., their: clients, advertisers, or contributors). For instance, there appears
to be an association between involvement with N.S.B.E., sponsor of the N.S.B.E. 100 list, and
inclusion on the list. N.S.B.E. reports that" All 26 members of its. Board of Corporate Affiliates
made the survey, with 13 of them appearing in the top 15" (1990, p. 42).
Those who create and translate reputations are not always able to collect all of the
requisite, in some cases proprietary, data they need (Lydenberg et al., 1986). When this is true,
the data collected are at best incomplete and at worst misleading. Other sampling problems
include: unreported or low response rates, on the order of 20%, (Sales and Marketine-
Mana~ement, 1988; 1990); a lack of standardization in the evaluation process--for instance, in
Workin~ Mother's inaugural survey, (1986) 30 companies were evaluated on 3 criteria and in the
most recent survey (1990) 75 companies were evaluated on 4 criteria; and potential response bias-
-for example, the "best for engineers" survey relies on responses to a questionnaire that is placed
in Graduatine- En~neer (1982-1990).
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Although the selection processes for some "best lists" may be rigorous.32questions are
increasingly being raised as to whether the force and focus has moved from the original purpose
of these designations (to foster quality improvement. for instance) to merely making a list or
winning an award (Quality Pro~ss. March. 1990).33
Another drawback is the fact that it may be difficult to isolate the exact day or month that
these reputation signals reached the fmancial markets. For example. the Best Companies for
Women book had an "official publication date" of April 1988. It was released to bookstores
approximately six weeks prior. advertised and promoted before this. and was. in the form of
galley proofs. in circulation even earlier. In our study, this limitation was addressed by examining
a variety of time horizons. For example, the effect of the "best companies for women" signal on
annual, monthly, and daily financial performance was evaluated using the QLS and event study
methodologies. In addition. multi-period cumulative abnormal returns were evaluated for the
signals.
Some HR reputation signals might have a difficult time even making it to market
participants. Many of these signals appear only in practitioner journals with small circulations and
limited audiences. If they do appear in national outlets. such as the Wall Street Journal (which is
seldom). often this information is not presented in its entirety and it usually receives less than
prominent placement
Clearly. there are a number of possible explanations for not detecting a relationship
between the corporate andHR reputation signals and financial performance. It is not clear,
though. that these limitations are sufficient enough to mask the reputation --performance
relationship altogether.
32See: Electronic Business (October 15, 1990) and Fortune (April 23, 1990).
33For an interesting discussion of the merits of this award and some new problems, one of which is the use of past
and future judges as advisors to applicants, see: Train in I!:(February, 1991).
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Implications for Future Research
There are abundant opportunities to further investigate the topic of HRM reputation. It
appears that the causes, consequences, and conditions of human resource management reputation
are all issues that merit further investigation.
For example, the effects of HRM reputation signals on ~ financial performance
measures could be studied. Specifically, one might want to study the effects of these signals on
long-run returns to shareholders (average financial performance over five or ten years).
Alternatively, measures of accounting performance such as sales or income could be examined.
Similarly, the effects of HR reputation signals on HR performance measures such as
employee attraction, retention, satisfaction, and productivity may also prove to be fruitful. In
somewhat the same vein, the effects of HR reputation signals on other corporate performance
measures might also be informative. The effect that these signals have on customers, measured in
terms of market share and customer satisfaction, is an example.
Studying the effects of additional HR reputation signals on corporate performance may be
also prove worthwhile. Most, if not all, of the HR reputation signals in existence have been
included in this analysis. Still, others are virtually certain to emerge over time.
Recall that the detenninants of corporate reputation have been widely studied. Likewise,
examining the determinants of HR reputation may also be of interest, especially in light of the
attention these various designations generate.
Case studies to determine and dissect the HR policies and practices of the HR reputation
leaders, likely to be interesting unto themselves, may also provide some insights into how
companies create and manage HRM reputations. Examining the role of HR reputation in settings
other than America and studying the importance of HR reputation for the multinational company
may also prove to be interesting.
To be sure, at least two major challenges remain. First, is it possible to aggregate these
HR reputation signals to create a comprehensive "HR reputation index." Such a measure could
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serve as a dependent variable for those interested in studying the antecedents of HR reputation or
an explanatory variable to examine the effects of HR reputation. Second, we need to explore why
the reputationnenlarged applicant poolnbetter hiresnimproved short- and long-term
peiformance scenario breaks down, in spite of the anectodal evidence that reputation affects the
behaviors of job applicants (Wall Street Journal, October 10, 1989; December 18, 1989).
To summarize, signaling theory, the efficient market hypothesis, conjecture, and, even,
intuition suggest that reputation signals should be related to corporate performance. In this study,
this was seldom the case. For some, this finding may not come as a surprise. Indeed, it may
easily be explained by making the case that investors never receive these HR reputation signals,
they already know the best finns, or they attach little weight to the judgments of various,
potentially self-interested, business observers, journalists and consultants. For others, particularly
those who have invested heavily in building a reputation and promoting it, this finding may be
quite disturbing--even costly.
Whatever the case, the results of this study suggest that the wisest counsel is to go ahead
and buy these "best company" communiques if you like, but don't use them to guide your stock
investment decisions.
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